Abstract. Using smart cards make remote transactions easier for users in Internet. It's important to identity the legal users to have the access right to obtain the resources. In 2017, Liu et al. proposed an efficient and secure smart card based password authentication scheme. Recently, Moon et al. pointed some weaknesses of Liu et al.'s scheme. They also proposed a password authentication scheme to overcome Liu et al.'s weaknesses. They claim that their scheme is more secure and practical as a remote user authentication scheme. However, we find that some weaknesses of Moon et al.'s scheme. In this article, we will show that Moon et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the guessing identity and impersonation attacks.
Introduction
Security is the need for everyone at home, at the office, on the street, and in every place, because it makes a person safely use security systems and prevent things that should not happen. The security system should be flexible, inexpensive and work continuously without being limited by working hours [1] [2] [3] . Smartcard-RFID is an advanced information technology embedded into a card as an information storage medium [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Implementation of smartcards has currently spread almost in all areas, whether it is used in hotels, homes, attendance at offices and educational institutions, as tough data security [9] [10] [11] [12] . Many schemes were applied a smart card to authenticate the legal users in multi-server environment [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . Other schemes are list in [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] .
In this paper, we propose modifications to the schemes provided by Moon et al.'s [35] . In their papers, we find a weaknesses during the phase registration, login and authentication, which attacks the security of data transmitted. We have made improvements by modifying the mathematical equations in the 3rd phase. From the given scheme, it can handle the problem of weaknesses during anonymous attacks and impersonation attacks.
This paper, we find that the security weaknesses of the two-factor authentication scheme by Moon et al. After careful analysis, we demonstrate that their scheme does not actually resist anonymous intercepts and user impersonation attacks. To overcome these security vulnerabilities, we propose a new biometrics-based authentication and key agreement scheme using a smart card. In addition, we demonstrate that the proposed authentication scheme is highly more resistant to various attacks, compared with other related schemes.
For more details we divide this paper into 4 Sections as follows: We briefly introduce some cryptographic definitions In Section 2, where we briefly review Moon et al.'s smart card-based password authentication scheme. In Section 3 its weaknesses is analyzed. Finally, we make a conclusion of the paper in Section 4.
Review of Moon et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we show that Moon et al.'s scheme, Secure Smart Card Based Password Authentication [35] , is insecure. Their scheme is an improvement of Liu et al.'s scheme [36] . In the scheme, there are two participants, the user Ui and the server S. The scheme consists of four phases: registration, login, authentication, and password changing phase. Some notations used in the scheme are described in Table 1 . 
Notation Meaning Ui
The ith user IDi,PWi The identity and password of the user i S
The server x
The master secret key stored in the S P The base point of the elliptic curve E rP
The point multiplication defined as rP = P + P+···+ P.
Ti
The
timestamp of the user Ui T'i
The time of receiving the login request message Ts
timestamp of the S T's
The time of receiving the mutual authentication message
Ri, Pi
The Ui's nearly random binary string and auxiliary binary string
The shared session key
Registration Phase
The server S selects the master secret key x, the base point P of the elliptic curve E and a collisionresistant one-way hash function h(·). Then, the user Ui registers to the server S by the way below:
Step 1. The Ui imprints the personal biometric information BIOi at the device sensor. The device sensor then scans the BIOi, extracts (Ri, Pi) from Gen(BIOi) → (Ri, Pi), and stores Pi in the memory. Next, Ui selects the identity IDi and password PWi, and calculate RPWi = h(PWi||Ri). Lastly, the Ui sends the registration request message {IDi, RPWi} to the S over a secure channel.
Step 2. After receiving the registration request message from the Ui, the server S verifies whether IDi is valid, and computes the following parameters:
Step 3. The server S stores the data {Bi, Ci, Di, h(·), P} on a new smart card and issues the smart card to the user Ui over a secure channel.
Step 4. The user Ui stores the random string Pi into the smart card.
Login Phase
After performing the registration phase, then the user proceeds on the login phase invoke Ui user to log into server S. The steps of this phase are done as follows.
Step 1. The Ui inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and enters the identity IDi and password PWi, and imprints the biometrics BIO * at the sensor. The sensor then sketches BIO * and recovers Ri from Rep(BIO * , Pi) → Ri BIO * .
Step 2. The smart card first computes two parameters: RPWi = h(PWi||Ri) and C'i = h(IDi||RPWi). The smart card then examines whether C'i is equal to the stored Ci. If this holds, the smart card continues to perform Step 3; otherwise, the smart card terminates this session.
Step 3. The smart card randomly generates a number α and ni, and computes the following parameters:
where Ti is the current timestamp of the user Ui.
Step 4. The smart card sends the login request message {AIDi, Di, Ei, Fi, Ti} to the server S.
Authentication Phase
Completing this phase, the user Ui and the server S could mutually authenticate each other and establish a shared session key for the subsequent secret communication. These steps of the authentication phase are shown as follows:
Step 1. The server S verifies whether T'i −Ti ≤ ∆T, where T'i is the time of receiving the login request message and ∆T is a valid time threshold. If both conditions are true, the server S continues to execute Step 2; otherwise, the server S rejects the login request.
Step 2. The server S computes the following parameters:
A'i = Di⊕x⊕h(x), ID'i = AIDi ⊕h(A'i), F'i = h(ID'I || h(A'i) || Ei || Ti). The server S then compares whether F'i is equals Fi. If this holds, the server S confirms that the user Ui is valid and the login request is accepted; otherwise, the server S rejects the login request.
Step 3. Next, the server S randomly generates a number β and computes the following parameters: Fi = βP, Gi = h(ID'i || h(A'i) || Fi || Ts), where Ts is the current timestamp of the server S.
Step 4. The server S sends the mutual authentication message {Fi, Gi, Ts} to the user Ui.
Step 5. Upon receiving the message {Fi, Gi, Ts} from the S, the user Ui checks the validity of the Ts. If T's − Ts ≤ ∆T, where T's is the time of receiving the mutual authentication message, the user Ui continues to perform Step 6; otherwise, the user Ui terminates this connection.
Step 6. The user Ui computes G'i = h(IDi || h(Ai) || Fi || Ts), then checks whether G'i is equal to the received Gi. If this holds, the validity of the server S is authenticated; otherwise, the session is terminated.
Step 7. Finally, the user Ui and the server S construct a shared session key: sk = αβP to ensure the secret communication.
Cryptanalysis of Moon et al.'s Scheme
Moon et al.'s scheme is based on the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). There are two weaknesses: Guessing identity and user impersonation attacks.
 Gussing Identity Attack: Moon et al.'s scheme [35] did not hide the ID user Ui in the login phase and authentication phase. The attacker could intercept AIDi, ID'i, Fi, Ts, and Gi from the login and authentication phases: User → Server: {AIDi, Di, Ei, Fi, Ti}, Server → User: {Fi, Gi, Ts).
The attacker can guess or steal it easily from an unsecure public channel. Then the attacker could check with guessing identity ID'i to hold the following equation: h(ID'i || (AIDi⊕ID'i) || Fi || Ts) =? Gi. In general, the identity was named by the user and the length of the identity is between 6 -12 characters (26 alphabets and 10 digits) . Therefore, the probability of guessing the identity is 1/ (36 12 ) in the worse cases.  User Impersonation
After knowing the user identity Ui, AIDi, and Di by the guessing identity attack, the attacker could impersonate the user Ui as follows:
The attacker by passes Steps 1 and 2 of the login phase.
Step 3: The attacker randomly generates a number α' and ni, and computes the following parameters:
where Ta is the current timestamp of the attacker.
Step 4: The attacker sends the login request message {AIDi, Di, E'a, F'a, Ta} to the server S.
Next, the server authenticates the identity of the attacker (an impersonated user) and establishes a shared session key for the subsequent secret communication. These steps of the authentication phase are shown as follows:
Step 1. The server S verifies whether Ts −Ta ≤ ∆T, where Ts is the time of receiving the login request message and ∆T is a valid time threshold. If both conditions are true, the server S continues to execute Step 2; otherwise, the server S rejects the login request.
Step 2. The server S computes the following parameters:
A'i = Di⊕x⊕h(x), ID'i = AIDi ⊕h(A'i), F'a = h(ID'I || h(A'i) || Ea || Ta). The server S then compares whether F'a is equals Fa. If this holds, the server S confirms that the attack is a legal user Ui and the login request is accepted; otherwise, the server S rejects the login request.
Step 3. Next, the server S randomly generates a number β and computes the following parameters: Fs = βP, Gs = h(ID'i || h(A'i) || Fs || Ts), where Ts is the current timestamp of the server S.
Step 4. The server S sends the mutual authentication message {Fs, Gs, Ts} to the user Ui.
Step 5. Upon receiving the message {Fs, Gs, Ts} from the S, the attacker checks the validity of Ts. If Ta − Ts ≤ ∆T, where Ta is the time of receiving the mutual authentication message, the attacker continues to perform Step 6. Step 6. The attacker computes G's = h(IDi || h(Ai) || Fs || Ts), then checks whether G's is equal to the received Gs. If this holds, the validity of the server S is authenticated. Step 7. Finally, the attacker and the server S construct a shared session key: sk = α'βP to ensure the secret communication.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the weaknesses of Moon et al.'s Scheme. Their scheme could not against the guessing identity attack and the user impersonation attack. In general, the probability of guessing the identity is 1/(36 12 ) in the worse cases, if the user selects his/her identity with 12 characters (26 alphabets and 10 digits).
